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ARGUMENT
POINT I; APPELLEE HAS FAILED TO OFFER PERSUASIVE
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT TO PROVE THAT AN AUTO AUCTION IS
A ^RECOGNIZED MARKET' FOR THE COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
SALE OF A VEHICLE.
Appellant's position that Appellee's sale of the vehicle was
commercially

unreasonable has not been disproven by Appellee.

Appellee's response to Appellant's brief is basically in two parts.
First, Appellee argues that the sale of the repossessed vehicle at
a wholesalers-only auto auction was a commercially reasonable sale
through a recognized market and thus Appellee claims to be entitled
to a deficiency from this sale.

Second, Appellee argues that

governing law should hold that, because a wholesalers-only auction
is a recognized market for the sale of a repossessed vehicle, the
methods of dealers in used vehicles should be ignored, and that the
Appellant, therefore, failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact precluding summary judgment.

Both of Appellee's arguments

fail for lack of support from the Uniform Commercial Code and the
case law interpreting it.
As the Appellant argued in his Brief, the law does not support
Appellee's

notion

that

a wholesalers-only

auto

"recognized market" for disposing of a vehicle.

auction

Appellee's Brief

cited to several cases as evidence of this position.

However these

cases are distinguishable and fail on their own grounds.

4

is a

Appellee relies upon Cfrrysler-Dodqe Country vt Cyrley, 782
P. 2d 536 (Utah App. 1989) .

Chrysler-Dodge involves the private

sale of a repossessed vehicle.
make a public sale:

At first, the dealer attempted to

"the dealer repaired and cleaned the truck and

placed it on its car lot for sale.

The truck was advertised and

shown on the retail lot with little interest from prospective
purchasers.

Chrysler Dodge then solicited bids for the truck from

other dealers."

Chrysler-Dodge at 537.

Eventually, the dealer

sold the vehicle to another Chrysler dealership for a price higher
than any other dealership had bid.
These facts alone support Appellant's position that this case
is distinguishable from the cases cited by Appellee.

The dealer

first marketed the vehicle retail to the general public to obtain
the best price possible for the sale of the vehicle and only
resorted to a wholesale private sale after its attempt at obtain a
retail price failed.

The Chrysler-Dodge opinion states,

"It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best
price possible for the benefit of the debtor. However,
the secured party does not have to use extraordinary
means. There is no requirement or prohibition that the
dealer must sell at wholesale or retail, but only that
the secured party obtains the best possible price under
the circumstances."
Id. At 541^542 (internal citations omitted).
While a retail sale is not required, it is required that the
best possible price be obtained, which indicates that a wholesale
price or less only be accepted after a retail sale was attempted.
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The

conduct

of the

several parties

in Chrysler-Dodge

is

precisely the same procedure which the Appellant has advocated
below.

Contrary to this procedure, Appellee here made absolutely

no effort to sell the vehicle for anything more than a wholesale
price.

Appellee cannot rely upon Chrysler-Dodae to support its

claim that the auto auction is a recognized market for obtaining
the best price for a used vehicle.
In

fact,

the

court

notes

in

Chrysler-Dodae

that

the

authorities are split as to whether repossessed vehicles are even
included in the "recognized market" exception of the U.C.C.

The

court therein cites one case which holds that an auto auction is a
recognized market under the U.C.C. and two cases which hold that a
used vehicle

is not customarily

Chrysler-Dodge, p.540, fn.6.
guide us here.

sold in such a market.

See

Our own practical observation should

If an auto auction is a "recognized market" for the

disposition of used cars, why do we have such a large number of
used

car

sales

lots?

This

case

fails to

support Appellee's

position that the auction is a recognized market and that the sale
was commercially reasonable.
The Appellee also relies upon Cottom v. Heppner, 777 P.2d 468
(Utah 1989), a case involving the sale of repossessed cattle at a
livestock auction.

As with Chrysler-Dodge, the court in Cottom

noted a split of authority over the reasonableness of a livestock
auction as a recognized market, though the court eventually took
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the position that under the facts of that particular case, the
jury's special verdict that the auction was a recognized market
would

not be

overturned.

Such

a holding

was

not

a blanket

endorsement of all auctions, but under the facts of that particular
case, the special verdict was upheld.
However, the distinction between the trade of livestock and
the trade of used vehicles was not ignored by the court.

The court

reviewed the fact that the auction was well advertised, there was
enthusiastic bidding, and the methods of sale were such as to
obtain the best price possible for the cattle.

Accordingly, Cottom

offers no more support for Appellee's position than Chrysler-Dodge.
Failing to find support
Appellee looks to other states.

from cases in this jurisdiction,
In both Ford Motor Credit Co. v.

Mathis, 660 So.2d 1273 (Miss. 1995) and Daniel v. Ford Motor Credit
Co.,

612 So.2d 483

(Ala.Civ.App. 1992),

the respective

courts

concluded that wholesale auto auctions were recognized markets for
the sale of repossessed vehicles based upon the testimony of expert
witnesses of the secured party.
the debtor.

Such testimony was uncontested by

In neither case was an opposing affidavit filed as

evidence or produced at trial to show that auto auctions were not
customarily used as the first resort for selling a used motor
vehicle.

These cases, in addition to being from other states,

stand for the proposition that if the non-moving party failed to
file a counter-affidavit to a motion for summary judgment supported
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by affidavits, or failed to offer opposing testimony, that party
would lose, and are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
Appellee does not even dispute some of the cases and arguments
cited by Appellant.

Appellant argued in his Brief that "Affidavits

which raise specific evidentiary facts create genuine issues which
preclude an order of summary judgment."

Brief of Appellant, p. 11.

Appellant cited to Treloaaan v. Treloaaan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985)
for support of this statement.

Only generally did Appellee respond

to this statement with no response to the case cited.
Further, Appellee ignored Appellant's citation from Utah case
law that "The purpose of the ^commercially' reasonable requirement
is *to get the best price obtainable for the truck'."

Brief of

Appellant, p. 13, Mass v. Allred, 577 P.2d 127, 128 (Utah 1978).
Appellee argues generally that there is no specific requirement in
the statute that the vehicle be sold at a retail price.

However,

as noted above, a retail price would clearly be a better price than
a wholesale price which

is the highest

obtained at the auto auction in this case.

that

could have been

Thus, the purpose of

the ^commercially reasonable' requirement, to obtain the best price
reasonable for a repossessed vehicle, would indicate that selling
the vehicle wholesale at auction with no attempt to sell it at a
retail price would not be commercially reasonable.

This is another

case and another argument which the Appellee has completely ignored
and which must be decided in Appellant's favor.
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Finally,
determinative

Appellee
in

this

ignored
appeal:

the

point

Whether

an

that
auto

is

auction

really
is

a

recognized market for the sale of a repossessed vehicle and is thus
a commercially reasonable means of disposing of such a vehicle is
a question of substantive fact which must be determined on a case
by case basis with regard to the surrounding circumstances of the
situation.

This is a rule of law laid out by both the Utah Supreme

Court and the Utah Court of Appeals.

If there is any ^governing

law' on this point, it is this: "In dealing with the issue of
commercial reasonableness, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded
that the issue of commercial reasonableness is fact sensitive and
is thus dependent on the totality of the commercial context"
Chrysler-Dodae Country v. Curley* 782 P.2d at 539.
Appellee's claim boils down to this: because Appellee, Larry
H. Miller Leasing, disposes of used cars through the auto auction
with no attempt to sell the vehicle at the best possible price,
which would be retail, the auto auction should be a ^recognized
market'.

This only proves that the auto auction is a recognized

market for Larry H. Miller Leasing.

This is far too arbitrary a

basis for determining what legally constitutes a recognized market.
It allows a used car seller to rely on any means, whether or not a
fair price is obtained for the vehicle, to dispose of a car as long
as they consistently use the same means.

This cannot be the basis

for determining the commercial reasonableness of a sale.
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It was therefore inappropriate for the trial court to decide
the matter of commercial reasonableness based only on precedence of
Appellee's stated procedure and distinguishable cases and this
Court should overturn the summary judgment of the trial court.
POINT II: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AFFIDAVITS BELOW
CONCERNED THE SUBSTANTIVE FACTS OF THE SUIT AND THUS CREATED A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Appellee's position that the conflict between the parties'
affidavits did not concern substantive governing law must also
fail.

As argued above, the governing law in this matter is to be

determined on a case by case basis where the affidavits are in
conflict, which in and of itself precludes summary judgment.
commercial

reasonableness

The

of the sale of a vehicle through a

wholesalers-only auto auction which would only bring a wholesale
price or less is the point that liability for the deficiency is
centered upon.
case.

There is no more substantive issue in a deficiency

Accordingly, Appellee's

argument

fails and the summary

judgment must be overturned.
Both parties submitted affidavits concerning the Utah Auto
Auction as a recognized market for the disposal of a repossessed
vehicle and whether that was commercially reasonable.

However,

Appellee argued in its Brief that the governing law is such that a
wholesalers-only auto auction is a recognized market for the sale
of a used vehicle and is thus a commercially reasonable means for
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disposing of a repossessed vehicle, and thus, Appellant's Brief did
not raise any genuine issues of material fact under governing law
and that summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
The governing law should first be clarified.

As shown above,

Appellee has failed to prove that the governing law supports its
position that a wholesaler-only auto auction is a recognized market
for the commercially reasonable disposition of used cars.

In fact,

the governing law is that such a determination can only be made on
a case by case basis.
"In
dealing
with
the
issue
of
commercial
reasonableness, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded that
the issue of commercial reasonableness is fact sensitive
and is thus dependant on the totality of the commercial
context. ^Whether any particular sale is commercially
reasonable is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
That determination depends on whether the circumstances
of the sale and the manner and business context in which
it occurred support a conclusion that the sale was
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.'"
Chrysler-Dodae County v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539 (Utah
App. 1989), citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1070-1071 (Utah 1985).
Instead of relying upon such a case-by-case analysis, Appellee
turned the Court's attention to Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242

(1986), which clarified

the grounds

for summary

judgment (though the case is based on defamation and is otherwise
irrelevant to the case at Bar). As Appellee quoted,
[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is
that there be no genuine
issue of material
fact.
Id. at 247-248 (emphasis in original).
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Appellee failed to mention that the Supreme Court went on to
note that "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is Agenuine', that is, if the evidence is such that
a

reasonable

jury

nonmoving party."

could

return

Id. at 248.

a

favorable

verdict

for

the

The Court has not required that the

disputed fact prove the nonmoving party's case, but only that
"sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth at trial."

Id. at 248-249, citing First

National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288289 (1968).
Accordingly,
sixteen

year

the plaintiff's Affidavit

dealer

in

used

vehicles,

of Gary Giffen, a

which

stated

that

a

repossessed vehicle would only be sold at auction after all other
attempts to sell the vehicle at a retail price had been exhausted,
was sufficient evidence to support the dispute over the commercial
reasonableness of selling a car at auction which should have been
resolved by the judge or jury, not on summary judgment.

The case

should have been decided on its facts alone, and thus this Court
should overturn the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons and on the grounds set forth above, the
Appellee, Larry H. Miller Leasing Co., has failed to show that the
trial court was correct to order summary judgment against the
Appellant, Karl E. Jorgenson. As the Appellant has attested, the
parties' conflicting affidavits created a genuine issue of material
fact thereby precluding summary judgment.

Therefore, this Court

should reverse the Order of Summary Judgment and any judgment
resulting therefrom.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of February, 1998.

13

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 5th, 1998 I had two true and
correct copies of the Appellant's Reply Brief mailed to the
following by first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid:

Jeffrey W. Shields
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorney for Appellee Larry H. Miller Leasing
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444

JOHN~~L. McCOY

